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Sammendrag
Denne oppgaven studerer sammenhengen mellom fondsprestasjon og tidligere kapitalstrømmer,
samtidig som den tar høyde for mulig persistens i prestasjon og innvirkning av fondsstørrelse
p˚a prestasjon. Vi tar i bruk et unikt datasett best˚aende av daglig avkastning og m˚anedlige
kapitalstrømmer inn og ut av alle norske fond. Dette inkluderer aksje-, obligasjons- og penge-
markedsfond registrert og handlet p˚a Oslo Børs i perioden 2006 - 2014. Datasettet er derfor
uten overlevelsesskjevhet, og v˚art hovedfokus er aksjefond. Vi finner kortsiktig persistens i
prestasjon for norske fond samlet, og at størrelse p˚a aksjefond er relatert til fondsprestasjon
n˚ar man tar høyde for prestasjonspersistens. Vi finner imidlertid ikke signifikante bevis p˚a
at tidligere kapitalstrømmer kan p˚avirke fondsprestasjon.
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Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between fund performance and past capital
flows, allowing for the possible impact of past performance and fund size. We use a
unique data set consisting of daily returns, monthly capital inflows and outflows for
all Norwegian mutual funds. This includes all equity, bond and money market funds
registered and traded at some point during 2006 - 2014 on Oslo Stock Exchange, making
our data set free of survivorship bias. Our main focus is equity funds. We find strong
evidence of short-term performance persistence for the full sample of Norwegian mutual
funds, and we find that equity mutual fund size is significantly related to performance
when accounting for performance persistence. However, we do not find any significant
impact of past inflows, outflows or net flows on fund performance.
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1 Introduction
The high returns to mutual fund investors during the 1980s and ’90s resulted in significant
public attention towards the industry. Since then the industry has been growing tremen-
dously; during the past decade the total net assets (TNA) of the Norwegian mutual fund
market has almost tripled in size2. As a result, the predictability of mutual fund performance
has become of great interest to investors and an important topic in finance.
The mutual fund literature has long recognized the positive relationship between past
performance and net fund flows, indicating that high performance leads to increased capital
inflows and low performance leads to increased capital outflows (Ippolito, 1992; Gruber,
1996; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). As the relationship between fund performance and succes-
sive capital fund flows has been established, it is natural to wonder whether the opposite
relationship might also hold true. Can capital fund flows influence fund performance?
Berk and Green (2004) presents a theoretical model of active portfolio management
addressing this issue. Based on the well known presumption that mutual fund investors
chase past performance, they argue that new money will flow into previously outperforming
funds. As a consequence, managers will increase the fund size to the point at which it will
impact the manager’s ability to generate superior returns and his expected future return
will decrease. This process continues until investors are indifferent between investing with
active managers or simply indexing, and equilibrium is achieved. As a result, Berk and
Green (2004) argue that managerial ability to generate excess returns cannot be effectively
employed at an arbitrarily large scale, meaning that funds experience diseconomies of scale
in active management. They find that the reasoning described above also holds true for
underperforming funds: investors withdraw their funds when the returns fall below the
risk-adjusted benchmark. These withdrawals seem, at first, to harm managers, but the
withdrawals also offer the managers the opportunity to improve the fund’s performance
again by concentrating on a smaller number of well-performing stocks.
Bessler et al. (2008) investigate the impact of fund flows and management turnover on
investment performance of actively managed equity mutual funds over time. They find that
future performance of past top performing funds strongly suffers from both the departure of
skilled fund managers (internal governance) and even more from excessive inflows (external
governance). The future performance of past loser funds benefits from a replacement of
their unskilled or unlucky managers but does not benefit from capital outflows to the same
degree. Bessler et al. find, consistent with the theory of Berk and Green (2004), that fund
inflows in combination with decreasing returns to scale erode the superior performance of
winner funds, while outflows gives loser funds the possibility to regain performance.
The theory of Berk and Green (2004) and findings of Bessler et al. (2008) motivates our
study investigating whether such a flow-performance mechanism might exist in the Norwe-
2Norwegian Mutual Fund Association (VFF).
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gian mutual fund market. We will refer to this effect as the ”Berk and Green mechanism”.
Influences leading to diseconomies of scale are further studied by Pollet and Wilson
(2008). They hypothesize that when a fund experiences high capital inflow, management
can either put more money into existing stocks and therefore incur higher transaction costs,
or it can increase the number of stocks in the portfolio, having to select securities with lower
expected returns. They find that management tends to choose the first option, rather than
increase the number of investments. Whichever choice the managers make, the consequences
seem to contribute to a lower rate of return of the fund in question.
Edelen et al. (2007) specifically investigates the role of trading costs as a source of
diseconomies of scale in mutual funds. They conclude that trading costs are detrimental to
performance as the fund’s relative trade size increases, and they further suggest that trading
costs are the primary source of diseconomies of scale. Contradictory to the findings of these
studies, Christoffersen et al. (2007) find that large-cap mutual funds have lower trading costs
than small-cap funds, and Chan et al. (2012) find that fund size has no significant impact
on trading costs.
Alexander et al. (2007) provide further research on mutual fund’s cost of liquidity, inves-
tigating how trading motivation of fund managers might affect fund performance. In line
with Pollet and Wilson (2008) and Edelen et al. (2007), they point out that the structure
of open-ended mutual funds sometimes forces fund managers to trade for liquidity reasons
as unanticipated investor flows require managers to continually rebalance their portfolios.
Alexander et al. (2007) argue that all trading that is not motivated by solely valuation
beliefs is consistent with noise trading, and should underperform valuation-based trades.
Hence, they argue that liquidity trading is detrimental to fund performance, and that fund
managers are unable to beat the market when investors’ flows forces them to invest excess
cash or sell stocks they would have preferred to hold longer based on valuation beliefs. These
findings are in line with those of Edelen (1999), who finds a statistically significant negative
relation between investor flows and the returns that fund investors receive. Edelen (1999)
also attributes this relationship to the cost of liquidity-motivated trading.
Inspired by Pollet and Wilson (2008), Edelen et al. (2007), and Alexander et al. (2007)
we wish to investigate whether absolute net flows inevitably contribute to a decrease in
performance due to transaction costs and liquidity motivated trading. We will refer to this
effect as the ”trading cost mechanism”.
Another explanation of how flows might influence performance, is through the so-called
”smart money effect”. This mechanism is based on the idea that investors are ”smart” if
they are able to predict future fund performance beyond what can be predicted from past
performance, and invest on this predictability. In contradiction to Ippolito (1992); Sirri and
Tufano (1998); Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the smart money effect implies that investors’
allocation of funds follow their ability to predict future performance. This prediction is
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based on other determinants than past performance, such as detecting the skill of a new
fund manager that will improve the fund performance, having insider information about the
expected future return of fund constituents, or possessing superior abilities to predict fund
returns. These assumptions are in line with the findings of Zheng (1999), who conclude that
smart money effect is not related to macro economic information or style effect, but rather
fund specific information.
Gruber (1996) investigates the smart money effect by looking at risk-adjusted returns
of newly invested money in actively managed mutual funds. He finds that the risk-adjusted
return on new capital flow is higher than the average risk-adjusted return for all investors in
these funds. Zheng (1999) looks further into this issue and finds that mutual fund investors
in aggregate are able to make decisions on whether to invest or extract money from funds
based on good assessment of short-term future performance of a fund.
In order to investigate the relationship between performance and past capital flows, cer-
tain conditions must be taken into account. As capital flows are found to follow performance,
it can be argued that current flows act as proxies of past fund performance. If these capital
flows further impact future performance, the codependent relationship between flow and
performance might indirectly contain information about performance persistence. Based
on this reasoning, we find it essential to investigate performance persistence in parallel to
funds’ impact on performance.
The subject of mutual fund performance persistence has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the literature of financial economics. Earlier studies such as Elton et al. (1996),
Elton et al. (2012), Hendricks et al. (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), and Brown and
Goetzmann (1995) find persistence in performance of funds. However, these studies are
based on monthly data, which only allow for analysis of performance persistence over longer
horizons. This might be a disadvantage in performance studies as persistence can be a short-
lived phenomenon (Bollen and Busse, 2005). These attributes are recognized by Gallefoss
et al. (2015), who study performance persistence in Norwegian mutual equity funds based
on daily returns. This is the first study on this topic utilizing daily data stemming from
outside the US. They find that the performance of Norwegian top and bottom performing
equity funds cannot be explained by luck, and that the performance of these funds persist
for short horizons of up to one year. These findings are in accordance with results from the
US on daily data (Busse, 1999; Bollen and Busse, 2005).
Even though performance persistence has been examined extensively, the majority of
previous empirical work involves either common stock funds or funds that invest in both
common stock and debt instruments (i.e. hybrid funds). Bond funds has grown immensely
in the Norwegian mutual fund market during the last decade3 and constitute a major part of
3Further information is provided in Section 2 and in Appendix 2.
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the mutual fund industry, yet there is very little information on bond fund performance4. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no studies on persistence in performance of Norwegian
bond and money market funds.
Based on previous theory and findings in mutual fund literature, fund flows seems to
trigger mechanisms that impact performance. However, this field of study is characterized
by little consensus among academics as many studies present contradicting results. As em-
pirical evidences are both diverging and few, we are motivated to contribute to the existing
literature by providing new evidence from Norway. Despite the fact that the Norwegian
economy is one of the most developed economies in the world, there are almost no studies
of Norwegian mutual funds.
Our unique data set consists of individual funds’ daily net asset values, monthly capital
inflows and outflows, reinvested dividends, and number of customers for all Norwegian
mutual funds registered and traded at some point in the period 2006 - 2014 on Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE). A great majority of the existing mutual fund research is based on monthly
net asset values, simply because these data are usually the only data available. However,
performance evaluation is problematic with solely monthly returns. Researchers can either
utilize monthly returns, which is a noisy measure of fund performance, or they can evaluate
performance over longer time horizons. Daily data allow for more precise performance
evaluations, which in turn allow us to study flow-performance relationships on shorter time
scale.
While most other mutual fund studies only have access to equity fund data, we have
data on the entire Norwegian mutual fund market including equity, bond, money market
and hybrid/other funds. Further, while most other studies are forced to approximate net
flows from NAV, our data set contains inflows, outflows and net flows. Additionally, our
capital flows are stated both as total flow and as flow from institutional, retail and foreign
customers.
We are therefore able to investigate fund flows’ influence on performance on a deeper
and more detailed level than the majority of previous studies. This study therefore offers a
new perspective on the impact of capital flows on mutual funds’ performance, a perspective
that may be of general economic interest as it provides additional insight as to what drives
fund performance, and may be of specific economic interest to fund managers, investors,
and other parties involved in the fund industry.
In order to investigate the problem at hand, we apply fixed effects panel data regression
on individual mutual fund data to capture the possible correlations between fund perfor-
mance and past performance, inflows and outflows. We focus particularly on equity funds
due to two assumptions that lead us to believe that such a relationship might be more
prevalent in equity funds than in bond and money market funds. First, the variety amongst
4Examples of studies that have investigated performance persistence in bond funds are Cornell and Green
(1991) and Blake et al. (1993)
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equity funds is greater than the variety of bond and money market funds which are often
more similar to each other. Second, the performance of bond and money market funds is
expected to be more influenced by interest rates than equity funds are.
As we measure performance as the risk-adjusted excess return of the fund, capital flows
are measured as a percentage change of the fund’s total net assets. We also study a set
of explanatory variables potentially related to fund performance. These variables will be
explained in greater detail later.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our
data set. In Section 3 we present our regression model and its variables. Section 4 analyzes
the regression results and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The Norwegian mutual fund market
During the last decade the Norwegian mutual fund market has grown tremendously. As seen
from Figure 1, the capital in Norwegian mutual funds has almost tripled from the beginning
of 2006 to the end of 2014.
Figure 1: Capital allocated in Norwegian mutual funds by fund category
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All mutual funds in the Norwegian fund market are organized into categories depending
on their investments and risk exposure. The main fund categories are equity funds, bond
funds, hybrid funds, money market funds, hedge funds/other funds, and other high yield
funds. The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF) defines equity funds
as mutual funds with 80-100 % exposure to the stock market, which will normally not invest
in interest-bearing instruments. Equity funds are divided into groups depending on which
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investment universe the funds are placed within. These investment universes might be geo-
graphically limited, sector and industry specific, or a combination of these. The subgroups
of equity funds and their benchmarks can be seen in Table 2, as well as bond and money
market funds and their benchmarks. VFF’s complete fund definitions and standards are
provided in Appendix 1. Due to the fact that hybrid funds consist of both equity and bond
components the regression results of hybrid funds and ”other funds” are expected to be
vague and ambiguous, and they are therefore excluded from our study.
Table 1: Capital in the Norwegian mutual fund market allocated among fund categories.
Fund category Market share in 2006 Market share in 2014
Equity funds 57 % 52 %
Bond funds 13 % 31 %
Money market funds 25 % 13 %
Hedge funds/other funds 5 % 4 %
Figure 2: Capital allocated in equity funds by investor type
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As seen from Figure 1 and Table 1, the three largest fund categories (measured by TNA)
are equity funds, bond funds, and money market funds. Equity funds have during the last
nine years constituted the largest group of funds, and its capital has steadily increased as
seen from Figure 2. The capital allocated in money market funds has remained stable during
the same period, while bond funds constitute the fund category that has increased the most
during 2006 to 2014, both relative to previous TNA and in absolute terms. This is seen from
Figure 1. The increase of capital allocated in bond and equity funds is presumably related
to the decrease of the Norwegian risk-free rate of return (NIBOR), as seen from Figure 3.
In an environment of low risk-free return, many investors allocate more capital to riskier
6
investments as the bank alternative yield little or no return.
Inflows, outflows and net flows of aggregated equity funds, as well as a more detailed
overview of the Norwegian mutual fund market are provided in Appendix 2.
Figure 3: Yearly risk-free rate of return (3 month NIBOR)
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The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF) also distinguish between
three different investor categories: Norwegian institutional investors, Norwegian retail in-
vestors, and foreign investors (both retail and institutional). Our study’s capital flows are
therefore stated both as total flows and as flows from each investor type. Since January
2013 retail investors have been split into two categories; Norwegian retail customers and
pension funds. However, in order to compare fund data from 2013 and 2014 with data
from previous years we continue to consider both retail investors and pension funds as one
combined investor group.
As evident from Figure 4 and Table 2, the Norwegian fund market has become more
influenced by institutional investor capital flows in 2014 than it was in 2006, when insti-
tutional and retail investors had almost the same amount of capital in Norwegian funds.
This is mainly due to the increase of institutional capital in equity and bond funds, as the
amount of retail capital has remained approximately the same.
Table 2: Capital in the Norwegian mutual fund market allocated among investors.
Investor category Market share in 2006 Market share in 2014
Institutional investors 46 % 56 %
Retail investors 46 % 30 %
Foreign investors 8 % 14 %
7
Figure 4: Capital allocated in Norwegian mutual funds by investor type
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2.2 Data description
Our data set combines information from two sources; VFF and Oslo Stock Exchange. Raw
flow data from VFF has been organized, structured and matched against capital data from
Oslo Stock Exchange. Fund return and risk-adjusted fund return (CAPM alpha) has been
calculated from total net asset values (TNA).
Our data set is free of survivorship bias. Survivorship bias is the tendency for mutual
funds with poor performance to be dropped by mutual fund companies, generally because
of poor results or low asset accumulation. Many losing funds are closed and merged into
other funds to hide poor performance. This phenomenon, which is widespread in the fund
industry, results in an overestimation of the past returns of mutual funds. In order to take
this important issue into account when analyzing past performance, we include all mutual
funds traded during the period 2006 - 2014.
Due to the fact that we measure capital flows as a percentage of the fund’s capital last
month5, we are faced with the issue of extreme flow values during the first months of a
fund’s lifetime, since the fund’s capital is very small compared to inflows. As we wish to
investigate the interaction between performance and previous flows during steady-state fund
conditions, we exclude all fund data from a fund’s start-up period, which we estimate to be
three months long on average. This means that if a fund exists for 17 months we only make
use of its latter 14 months of data.
When funds are liquidated the capital released from the fund is not included as fund
outflows. This is because it is often the management of the fund and not its investors who
5Flow variables will be described in more detail in the next section.
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choose to liquidate a fund, and so liquidation is not an outflow of the type we wish to
describe.
2.2.1 Data requirements
Due to the longitudinal nature of our data, we introduce two requirements for individual
fund flows before performing panel data regressions. The rationale behind these assump-
tions is to exclude funds with many monthly observations of zero flow (which usually are
small funds with few customers) and to capture funds that are openly traded. Figure 5 and
Figure 6 illustrate the consequences of these requirements.
Requirement 1
Number of monthly flow observations ≥ 12
Requirement 2
Average number of institutional customers ≥ 20, or
Average number of retail customers ≥ 100, or
Average number of total customers ≥ 20
The three restrictions above are set separately for each investor category, implying that
a fund that does not satisfy one of the requirements can still be included if it satisfies one
of the other requirements. As a result, only one of the requirements in ”Requirement 2”
needs to hold true for a fund to be included in the reduced fund subset.
With these data requirements, the initial sample of 468 equity funds, 66 bond funds and 56
money market funds is reduced. The new subset consists of 311 equity funds, 46 bond funds
and 51 money market funds. This subset of equity funds is further reduced to 262 funds
due to the fact that many equity funds are categorized as ”other types of equity funds”,
without geographical or sector specific affiliation. This makes it difficult to compare them to
a proper benchmark, and without a benchmark index we are unable to calculate the fund’s
excess rate of return (CAPM alpha). As a consequence, these funds are excluded from our
study.
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Figure 5: Inflow from institutional investors to the equity fund ODIN Norge II. With the
requirement of a minimum number of average institutional customers, this fund is excluded.
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Figure 6: Inflow from institutional investors to the equity fund SKAGEN Global. With
the requirement of a minimum number of average institutional customers, this fund is still
included.
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3 Definition of variables and methodology
The core of our study is to investigate the relationship between performance and past capital
flows of mutual funds. In order to preserve the individual differences between funds caused
by fund-specific characteristics such as relative performance and idiosyncratic volatility, we
perform regressions on individual mutual funds. Inspired by Spiegel and Zhang (2013),
Huang et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2013), we utilize fixed effects panel data regressions to
incorporate the longitudinal nature of the data. Our data set is regarded as an unbalanced
panel, as individual funds are observed different numbers of times. The Hausman test
(Hausman, 1978) confirms the suitability of fixed effects panel regression on our data set.
We also use robust standard errors to deal with the possible issues of heteroskedasticity,
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and we include time dummies to control for time or month-varying effects. However, these
dummies are omitted from our regression results.
Our fundamental panel data regression for individual mutual funds is given below. We
believe that if a relationship between risk-adjusted performance and past capital flow exists,
the power of explanation lies in the near past. Hence, inflows and outflows are lagged with
one month. Inspired by the recent findings of Gallefoss et al. (2015), we include one, two and
three-months lagged performance in order to allow for short-term performance persistence.
This model is expanded with explanatory variables where suitable, which will be further
explored and elaborated on in the result section.
αi,t = β0 + β1αi,t−1 + β2αi,t−2 + β3αi,t−3 + β4INi,t−1 + β5OUTi,t−1 (1)
where α is the CAPM risk-adjusted Jensen’s alpha, and IN and OUT are capital inflows
and outflows, respectively. These variables are defined below.
3.1 Dependent variables
In order to evaluate and compare fund performances, we calculate performance as the
monthly risk-adjusted excess return of each fund, or Jensen’s alpha. Monthly alpha is
regressed from the one-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using daily return ob-
servations.
ri,t − rf,t = αi,t + βi,t(rm,t − rf,t) + i,t (2)
The fund’s return, ri,t, minus the risk-free rate of return (the return of 3-month gov-
ernment bond index), rf,t, constitutes the excess return of the fund; the risk premium for
holding the fund rather than risk-free assets. A fund’s rate of return is obtained from
changes in daily net asset value (NAV) per share provided by Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).
NAV is adjusted for dividend payments.
The rate of return of a fund’s appropriate market index or benchmark, rm,t, minus the
risk-free return is the excess return of the benchmark that the fund is compared with. The
benchmarks corresponding to the various categories of mutual funds can be seen in Table 3.
αi,t should intuitively be zero as we expect to receive the same rate of excess return for
owning assets in a fund as we would do by being exposed to the same amount of risk in the
market. If alpha is positive, the fund provides the investor with an abnormal rate of return
given the risk level.
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Table 3
Benchmarks used for the various categories of mutual funds. Equity funds are given benchmarks based
on their geographical, sector or industry specific investment universe. Bond funds are divided into groups
depending on their expected interest rate sensitivity: 0-2, 2-4, or interest rate sensitivity higher than 4. Low
(high) interest rate sensitivity give governmental bond index with shorter (longer) duration as benchmarks.
Money market funds are bond funds that can solely invest in interest-bearing instruments with remaining
fixed interest of 365 days or less. Money arket funds are therefore given the benchmark of 6 month duration
governmental bond index, egardless of their interest rate sensitivity.
Mutual funds No. of funds Benchmark
Norwegian funds 62 OSE Fund Index (OSEFX) (NOK)
Global funds 59 MSCI World ($)
European funds 23 MSCI Europe ($)
Nordic funds 27 MSCI Nordic ($)
North American funds 13 MSCI USA ($)
Asia excluding Japan funds 11 MSCI Asia Pac. Excl. Japan ($)
Emerging markets funds 16 MSCI Emerging Markets ($)
Japanese funds 10 MSCI Japan ($)
Eastern European funds 5 MSCI EM Eastern Europe ($)
Chinese funds 6 MSCI China ($)
Swedish funds 3 MSCI Sweden ($)
Latin America funds 3 MSCI EM Latin America ($)
Indian funds 2 MSCI India ($)
Sector funds - Finance 2 MSCI ACWI Financials ($)
Sector funds - Health Care 10 MSCI ACWI Health Care ($)
Sector funds - Technology 10 MSCI ACWI IT ($)
All equity funds 262
Bond funds 0-2 14 Gov. bond index 1 year (ST3X)
Bond funds 2-4 29 Gov. bond index 3 years (ST4X)
Bond funds 4+ 3 Gov. bond index 3 years (ST4X)
All bond funds 46
Other short m.m. funds 24 Gov. bond index 6 months (ST2X)
Other long m.m. funds 6 Gov. bond index 6 months (ST2X)
Short m.m. funds - low credit risk 19 Gov. bond index 6 months (ST2X)
Long m.m. funds - low credit risk 2 Gov. bond index 6 months (ST2X)
All money market funds 51
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3.2 Independent variables
We define fund flows as a fraction relative to the fund’s previous month’s TNA. This can
be interpreted as the percentage growth in assets beyond return and reinvested dividends.
The flow variables are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Flow variables for panel data regression
Description Abbreviation Math. expression
Inflow IN ci,t
Inflowci,t
TNAi,t−1
Outflow OUT ci,t
Outflowci,t
TNAi,t−1
Net flow NET ci,t
Netflowci,t
TNAi,t−1
C = {Retail investors, institutional investors, all investors (total)}
I = {Set of mutual funds}
IN ci,t = Capital inflow for fund i in month t for investor category c
OUT ci,t = Capital outflow for fund i in month t for investor category c
NET ci,t = Capital net flow for fund i in month t for investor category c
TNAci,t = Total net assets of fund i in month t for investor category c
Explanatory variables
Inflow times two-months lagged alpha: IN ci,t−1αi,t−2
The magnitude and sign of αt−2 reflect the fund’s excess performance during month
t − 2. We use the new variable, IN ci,t−1 · αi,t−2, to check whether the impact of inflows
on fund performance differs depending on whether the fund was previously top or bottom
performing. This variable will therefore investigate the Berk and Green mechanism, as this
mechanism predicts that previous top performing funds perform worse as a consequence of
high inflows, and previous bottom performing funds perform better as a consequence of high
outflows.
Outflow times two-months lagged alpha: OUT ci,t−1αi,t−2
The magnitude and sign of αt−2 reflect the fund’s excess performance during month
t− 2. We use the new variable, OUT ci,t−1 · αi,t−2, to check whether the impact of outflows
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on fund performance differs depending on whether the fund was previously top or bottom
performing. This variable will therefore investigate the Berk and Green mechanism, as this
mechanism predicts that previous top performing funds perform worse as a consequence of
high inflows, and previous bottom performing funds perform better as a consequence of high
outflows.
Capital of the fund: log(TNA)ci,t−1
The logarithm of the total net assets of the fund i at time t− 1, for investor category c.
Inflow times fund capital: IN ci,t−1log(TNA)
c
i,t−1
Inflow times logged capital of the fund is included in order to check whether inflow has
an impact on performance through capital size.
Outflow times fund capital: OUT ci,t−1log(TNA)
c
i,t−1
Outflow times logged capital of the fund is included in order to check whether outflow
has an impact on performance through capital size.
Absolute total net flows: |NET ci,t−1|
This is the absolute value of capital net flows for fund i in month t− 1 for investor cat-
egory c. This variable is included to check for the transaction costs effect, which is present
in our data set if absolute net flows deteriorate performance.
4 Analysis and results
In this section, we present and discuss the findings from our study of capital flows’ possible
impact on equity, bond and money market fund performance. We use fixed effects panel
data regression with Equation 1 as our starting point, which we extend further in order to
evaluate this relationship from different points of view.
As elaborated on earlier, there are multiple possible explanations for why a relationship
between performance and past capital flows can exist. Three such possible explanations
are the Berk and Green mechanism, the transaction costs effect, and the smart money
effect. We are curious to not only investigate the relationship between performance and
past capital flows in general, but also take a closer look at the possible presence of these
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mechanisms in the Norwegian mutual fund market. Table 5 presents a simplified summary
of the empirical predictions that must hold true in order for the different flow-performance
mechanisms to exist. More thorough explanations of the mechanisms are given subsequently.
Table 5: Summary of possible mechanisms where flow influence performance
Short
name
Mechanism Empirical prediction
B&G
mechanism
High fund performance leads to high in-
flows, and high inflows decrease fund per-
formance due to diseconomies of scale.
↑ αt−2+ ↑ inflowt−1 ⇒ ↓ αt
Low fund performance leads to high out-
flows, and high outflows increase fund
performance due to diseconomies of scale.
↓ αt−2+ ↑ outflowt−1 ⇒↑ αt
Trans. costs
High absolute net flows lead to increased
transaction costs, hence decreased alpha.
|netflowt−1| ⇒ ↓ αt
Smart
money
High inflow can indicate investors’ ability
to predict superior performance beyond
what past performance predicts.
↑ inflowt−1 ⇒ ↑ αt
High outflow can indicate investors’ abil-
ity to predict inferior performance beyond
what past performance predicts.
↑ outflowt−1 ⇒ ↓ αt
The results from regressing Equation 1 on equity, bond and money market funds are
presented in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. The regression results provide us
with three findings.
Our first finding is the existence of short-term performance persistence. As evident from
Table 6, one-month lagged alpha is consistently positive and significant for all regression
variations, implying robust short-term persistence for equity funds. Due to the fact that
two and three-months lagged alphas are consistently insignificant in Table 6, we conclude
that the performance in equity funds is only persistent for one month in our data set.
The regression results in Table 7 and Table 8 indicate a longer-lasting performance
persistence for bond and money market funds. As evident from the regressions coefficients,
both one, two and three-months lagged alphas are significant, although two-months lagged
alpha is somewhat less consistent. The coefficients of previous alphas in bond and money
market funds are negative, which indicates that performance is mean-reverting for these
funds.
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Our finding of short-term performance persistence in equity funds support the recent
findings of Gallefoss et al. (2015), who observe short-term performance persistence in Nor-
wegian equity mutual funds for up to one year. As there are no studies on performance
persistence in Norwegian bond and money market funds (to the best of our knowledge),
there are no findings in the Norwegian mutual fund market to directly compare our findings
with. Internationally, however, our regression results support those of Elton et al. (2012),
Elton et al. (1996), Hendricks et al. (1993). Our finding contradicts those of Blake et al.
(1993), who find no predictability in bond fund performance. As we utilize daily returns
as opposed to the monthly data of Blake et al. (1993), we suspect that we might observe
persistence of shorter time periods than what they are able to.
Our second finding is that fund size is significantly related to performance in equity
mutual funds when accounting for performance persistence. This is evident from Table 6,
where the log value of fund capital has a negative and significant coefficient throughout all
regression variations for equity funds. Possible explanations for why fund size might have
a detrimental impact on performance are given by previous fund literature. Gruber (1996)
and Berk and Green (2004) claim that large equity funds face challenges of scale ability
of investments, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that small funds are more active while
larger funds tend to move closer to indices, and Chen et al. (2004) observe that larger funds
must trade larger volumes of stock, attracting the attention of other market participants
and therefore suffering higher price impact costs.
The logged capital coefficient is insignificant for bond and money market funds (as seen
in Table 7 and Table 8), indicating that size does not impact performance in bond and money
market funds, after accounting for performance persistence. These observations might be
attributed to the fact that bond and money market funds are more scalable than equity
funds.
Our third finding is that we do not observe consistent tendencies of capital flows im-
pacting performance. As seen from Table 6, inflows and outflows are insignificant in the
first variations of the regression. However, when we allow flow variables to depend on fund
size in order to explain whether flows can impact performance through capital size (we in-
troduce IN toti,t−1log(TNA)
tot
i,t−1 and OUT
tot
i,t−1log(TNA)
tot
i,t−1 in the regression), the results
change. Now, both OUT toti,t−1log(TNA)
tot
i,t−1 and OUT
tot
i,t−1 have significant coefficients, and
we observe that equity outflows may have an impact on performance through capital size.
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However, in order to conclude that outflows indeed influence performance through capital
size, these observations must be robust for the different investor types.
Due to lack of significant flow coefficients in the bond and money market regressions, we
arrive at the same conclusion as we do for equity funds: the impact of flow on performance
is very weak or inexistent in the Norwegian fund market.
The relationship between performance and past capital flows in equity funds is further
illustrated in Table 9, Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12. The matrices in these tables are
constructed in the following way. Every month, we rank all active funds by their performance
during that month, creating one top, middle and bottom performing fund portfolio. We call
this month the ranking month. We then calculate the average alpha of these portfolios,
resulting in one average alpha for the top portfolio, one for the medium portfolio, and one
for the bottom portfolio. Every month, funds are re-ranked and three new portfolios are
created. After doing this for all months in our data set (108 months), we calculate the
average of the 108 top, medium and bottom average portfolio alphas. This gives us three
alphas, presented as ”month t− 1” average alphas in Table 9.
As we are interested in observing how these top, medium and bottom performing funds
perform in the month subsequent to their ranking month, we gather the alphas of the
funds from the original portfolios in the subsequent month and average these subsequent
alphas. These average alphas are again averaged over the 108 subsequent months, resulting
in ”month t” average alphas in Table 9. To sum up, the average alphas of month t − 1
are the alphas of top, medium and bottom performing funds ranked in that month, while
the alphas of month t are the alphas of funds that was ranked as top, medium or bottom
performing in the ranking month.
In order to illustrate how flow impacts these fund portfolios from one month to the next,
we further divide the top, medium and bottom funds into subgroups, ranked by their capital
inflows, outflows and net flows in month t− 1 (as seen in Table 10, 11 and 12, respectively).
If a fund is both top performing and receiving high inflows in the ranking month, it is put
in the ”top alpha, top inflow” portfolio. As a fund is ranked both in regards to performance
(top, medium or bottom) and flow (high, average or low inflow, outflow or net flow), we are
provided with 18 portfolios each month. We calculate these portfolios’ average alphas for
month t−1 (ranking month) and month t (subsequent month) in the same way as described
above.
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By studying Table 9, we observe that the average alphas of the three different perfor-
mance ranked fund portfolios in month t (the ranking month) differ quite a bit. The average
of the same funds in the subsequent month, however, have moved towards each other and
the extremeties have been smoothed out. Our finding from the regression results is therefore
confirmed when Table 10, 11 and 12 display the average impact of high, medium and low
capital inflows on future performance. It is evident that, on average, a fund’s performance is
much more dependent on whether the fund was a winner or loser fund in its ranking month
rather than the size and timing of its capital flows. This underpins the main finding of our
study, namely that flows do not impact performance significantly.
As seen from these alpha-flow matrices, top alpha funds decrease on average from its
ranking month to the next, and bottom alphas improve. We also observe that the aver-
age of the previous top performing funds still perform better in the next month than the
average of the previous medium and bottom performing funds. This implies one-month per-
formance persistence in equity funds, which support our findings from the regression results.
Table 9: Average alphas in month t− 1 and t
Av alpha, month t-1 Av alpha, month t
Average top alpha 0,417 0,144
Average medium alpha 0,056 0,099
Average bottom alpha -0,189 0,062
21
Table 10: Average alphas in month t− 1 and t, categorized by inflow
(a) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the ranking month,
t− 1.
High inflow Medium inflow Low inflow
Top performing funds 0.434 0.409 0.408
Medium performing funds 0.059 0.056 0.053
Bottom performing funds -0.186 -0.197 -0.183
(b) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the month following
the ranking month, t.
High inflow Medium inflow Low inflow
Past top performing funds 0.156 0.130 0.142
Past medium performing funds 0.096 0.104 0.098
Past bottom performing funds 0.061 0.069 0.055
Table 11: Average alphas in month t− 1 and t, categorized by outflow
(a) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the ranking month,
t− 1.
High outflow Medium outflow Low outflow
Top performing funds 0.423 0.452 0.375
Medium performing funds 0.054 0.055 0.058
Bottom performing funds -0.205 -0.189 -0.172
(b) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the month following
the ranking month, t.
High outflow Medium outflow Low outflow
Past top performing funds 0.159 0.143 0.127
Past medium performing funds 0.108 0.093 0.099
Past bottom performing funds 0.059 0.064 0.063
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Table 12: Average alphas in month t− 1 and t, categorized by net flow
(a) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the ranking month,
t− 1.
High net flow Medium net flow Low net flow
Top performing funds 0.423 0.407 0.422
Medium performing funds 0.059 0.053 0.055
Bottom performing funds -0.183 -0.184 -0.199
(b) Average alphas of top, medium and bottom performing fund portfolios in the month following
the ranking month, t.
High net flow Medium net flow Low net flow
Past top performing funds 0.146 0.135 0.148
Past medium performing funds 0.108 0.097 0.094
Past bottom performing funds 0.067 0.064 0.056
4.1 Berk and Green mechanism
When investigating the Berk and Green mechanism, certain tendencies must be present in
order to exist. As Berk and Green’s model argues, top performing funds will attract so
much new capital that it will impact the fund manager’s ability to generate superior return,
and future performance will decrease. The opposite is found for bottom performing funds,
namely that the low return will drive investors to withdraw their money, making it possible
for the fund manager to regain control of the fund and its performance. In our model, this
mechanism is observed if high inflow deteriorates the performance of previous outperforming
funds, giving the coefficient of INi,t−1αi,t−2 a significant negative sign, and vice versa, that
high outflow improves the future performance of previous underperforming funds, giving the
coefficient of OUTi,t−1αi,t−2 a significant positive sign.
The results from our main regression presented in Table 6 indicate that there is no such
flow-performance relationship in our data set. The alpha-flow matrices in Table 9, 10, 11 and
12 underpin this finding. Berk and Green (2004) claim that top performing funds receiving
high inflows are expected to perform worse than top performing funds receiving medium or
low inflow, and that bottom funds experiencing high outflow should perform better than
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bottom funds experiencing medium or low outflow. Neither of these tendencies are observed
in the alpha-flow matrices as high and low flows create marginal differences in the average
alphas.
All in all, we are unable to find statistically significant confirmation of Berk and Green’s
flow-performance mechanism in our data set.
4.2 Transaction costs effect
When a mutual fund receives positive net flows, hence larger inflows than outflows, the fund
has several opportunities. It can either accumulate cash, increase the fraction of existing
positions, purchase securities it does not currently own, or simply invest in its benchmark.
However, when a fund experiences negative net flows the mutual fund only has two options:
prey on its cash reserves or liquidate positions. This is due to the fact that mutual funds
are prevented from raising money by short selling. As it is very costly for a mutual fund to
maintain a large cash buffer, we make a simplifying assumption that all large absolute net
flows lead to transactions, and hence transaction costs. Following this rationale, we view all
flow-induced trading as liquidation motivated trading, which is equivalent to noise trading
and ergo should underperform valuation-based trades (Alexander et al., 2007).
Based on this assumption, we expect the transaction cost mechanism to decrease future
performance whenever absolute net flows are high. As evident from our regression results
in Table 6, we do not observe a significant relationship between absolute net capital flows
and performance, and so we dismiss the presence of transaction costs effect in our data set.
4.3 Smart money effect
The smart money effect is based on the idea that investors are able to predict future fund
performance beyond what previous performance predicts, and invest on this predictability.
Investors are considered to be ”smart” if they are well-informed (e.g. have private infor-
mation about the fund managers’ ability to generate superior returns, or inside information
on the expected performance of the fund), or in some other way posses the ability to place
capital in future top performing funds. This way, capital flows can encapsulate information
about smart investors.
In order to observe the smart money effect in our regressions, capital flows must impact
performance after accounting for performance persistence. As evident from Table 6, we do
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not observe such a relationship in the Norwegian mutual fund market.
4.4 Robustness tests
To ensure that our results are robust, we perform several regressions on variables and mea-
sures not included in our main study. This will help us to ensure that our results are not
simply consequences of misspecifications. The different variables that are tested for robust-
ness and their results are presented below, while a full overview of the regression coefficients
is provided in Appendix 3.
4.4.1 Capital flows from institutional and retail investors
As explained previously, our data set consists of flow data stated both as total flows and
flows from institutional, retail and foreign investors. In order to check that there is no
additional information latent in the capital flows from different investor groups, we perform
the regressions presented in Table 6 for each investor type. Foreign investors will not be
studied separately as the number of observations is limited. Additionally, foreign investors
constitute a of mix of institutional and retail investors, therefore the results will be difficult
to interpret. However, when results are presented for investors overall, foreign investors are
included. The results for institutional and retail investor flows are presented in Table 15
and Table 14, respectively.
Based on the regression results in Table 15 and 14, we conclude that performance persis-
tence is robust and that including private and institutional flows separately does not change
this conclusion.
We also study whether different investor flows collectively can predict performance. We
suspect that each investor flow incorporate different information that can impact fund per-
formance, and so we regress all investors flows in one joint regression. This regression is
presented in Table 13.
We observe the same tendencies when we regress alpha on individual investor flows as
we do when we regress alpha on total flows (Table 6). Hence, running regressions on flows
fed by different types of investors do not alter our main findings, and our results are robust.
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4.4.2 Historical rate of return
While our study uses the CAPM alpha as the measure of a fund’s excess return, excess return
can also be measured as the historical rate of return of a fund minus the average historical
return of the fund’s specific fund group. As an example, instead of using the monthly Oslo
Stock Exchange Mutual Fund index (OSEFX) as the benchmark for the Norwegian fund
”DNB Norge” and calculate the fund’s alpha by regression, we can use the average historic
return of all Norwegian funds during that month and find DNB Norge’s deviation from this
average. This way, DNB Norge is still comparable to other Norwegian funds, and we are
able to tell whether DNB Norge is performing better or worse than the fund group average.
In order to check our return measure for robustness, we perform the regressions presented
in Table 6 with excess historic rate of return as dependent variable. It is evident from
Table 16 with retail flows, Table 17 with institutional flows, and Table 18 with total flows
that performance persistence is also found with historical excess return as return measure.
However, using excess historic return yields a positive significance in up to three-months
lagged alpha, two months more than we obtain with alpha as return measure. This is due to
the fact that excess historical return is a more noisy measure of performance than alpha is.
As averaging a noisy measure over several periods can help cancel out noise, our conclusion
of one-month performance persistence in equity funds is not contradicted by these regression
results.
The regression results on flows from institutional investors (Table 17) and all investors
(Table 18) both have negative and significant coefficients for logged capital, which is consis-
tent with the regressions using CAPM alpha as excess return measure. Regressions on flows
from retail investors (Table 16) suggest significant first-lagged inflow. This is also found in
the regression on retail flows using alpha as return measure in Table 14. However, due to
the fact that significant coefficients are expected when regressing with very few variables,
and that the inflow coefficients are diminishingly small, we do not find these results very
robust.
Overall, these findings draw in the same direction as our main regression results with
alpha as return measure, implying that using excess historic rate of return will lead us to
the same conclusion we arrive at when using alpha as return measure. Hence, we conclude
that our choice of CAPM alpha as return measure is robust.
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5 Conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between fund performance and past capital flows,
allowing for the possible impact of past performance and fund size. We use a unique data set
consisting of daily returns, monthly capital inflows and outflows for all Norwegian mutual
funds. This includes all equity, bond and money market funds registered and traded at some
point during 2006-2014 on Oslo Stock Exchange, making our data set free of survivorship
bias. We examine both the relationship in general as well as three examples of possible
flow-performance mechanisms: the Berk and Green mechanism, the transaction costs effect,
and the smart money effect.
Our chosen method of investigation is fixed effects panel data regression, where the
CAPM risk-adjusted rate of return (alpha) is regressed on previous return, capital flows,
logged fund capital and several other explanatory variables. We also perform regressions on
flows from institutional and retail investors, and construct alpha and flow matrices to gain
further insight as to how past flows and performance are related.
Based on the results from our regressions and tests, we present three findings. Our first
finding is that the performance of all Norwegian mutual funds is persistent for a short time
period. The performance persistence is positive for equity funds and negative for bond
and money market funds, implying mean reversion in bond and money market funds. This
finding confirms the discoveries of Gallefoss et al. (2015) on Norwegian equity mutual funds,
and contributes to the existing mutual fund literature with new findings on Norwegian bond
and money market funds.
The second finding is that equity mutual fund size is significantly related to performance
when accounting for performance persistence. Fund capital is consistently negative and
significant through all regressions, indicating a detrimental relationship between equity mu-
tual fund size and performance. We do not observe the same tendencies in bond and money
market funds, which we attribute to the scalability of bond and money market funds.
Our third finding is that we do not find a relationship between performance and past
capital flows. This is due to insignificant and inconsistent flow coefficients, at best indicating
a vague connection between lagged outflow and performance. As a consequence, the flow-
performance mechanisms of Berk and Green, the transaction cost effect and the smart money
effect are unobservable in Norwegian equity, bond and money market funds.
We encourage future research to further investigate two of our findings. First, we believe
28
it is of interest to deepen our study of the flow-performance relationship using more so-
phisticated models. Second, given recent findings of short-term performance persistence in
Norwegian equity funds (Gallefoss et al., 2015) and our findings of short-term performance
persistence in all Norwegian mutual funds, we believe it is of great interest to use our unique
data set for more thorough studies of performance persistence in bond and money market
funds.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1 - Definitions and standards for fund classification
The industry standards for fund classification by The Norwegian Fund and Asset Manage-
ment Association (VFF) (2015):
Definition of equity funds:
A mutual fund with 80-100 % exposure to the stock market, and will normally not invest
in interest-bearing instruments. Equity funds are further divided into groups depending on
which investment universe the funds are placed within. The investment universe might be
limited by geography, sectors and industry, or combinations of these.
Definition of hybrid funds:
A mutual fund with less than 80 % exposure to the stock market, and remaining holdings
invested in interest-bearing instruments. Life cycle fund is a type of hybrid fund where the
proportion of shares and bonds within the fund vary through the life of the fund.
Definition of other mutual funds:
All mutual funds that do not categorize as equity funds, bond funds, or hybrid funds (e.g.
hedge funds or funds that use a lot of derivatives).
Definition of money market fund:
A bond fund that can solely invest in interest-bearing instruments with remaining fixed
interest of 365 days or less. A money market fund must have an interest rate sensitivity of 1
or less. If a money market fund has an interest rate sensitivity of 0.5 or less, it is a low risk
money market fund. If the fund invests in interest-bearing instruments denoted in another
currency than Norwegian kronas (NOK), it is an international money market fund.
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Definition of bond funds:
All bond funds that invest in Norwegian interest-bearing instruments. Bond funds are di-
vided into three groups, depending on their expected interest rate sensitivity: 0-2, 2-4, or
interest rate sensitivity higher than 4. Bond funds investing in instruments denoted in an-
other currency than NOK qualifies as an internation bond fund.
Definition of other bond funds:
All bond funds that do not meet the requirements of the groups mentioned above.
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6.2 Appendix 2 - Illustrations of the Norwegian fund market
6.2.1 Capital allocated in equity, bond and money market funds
Figure 7: Capital allocated in equity funds by investor type
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Figure 8: Capital allocated in bond funds by investor type
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Figure 9: Capital allocated in money market funds by investor type
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6.2.2 Inflow, outflow and net flow to equity funds
Figure 10: Inflow to equity funds by investor type
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Figure 11: Outflow of equity funds by investor type
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Figure 12: Net flow of equity funds
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6.2.3 Customers in equity, bond and money market funds
Figure 13: Number of customers in equity funds by investor type
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Figure 14: Number of customers in bond funds by investor type
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Figure 15: Number of customers in money market funds by investor type
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6.3 Appendix 3 - Robustness regressions
Table 14: Retail investor flows in equity funds
Table 15: Institutional investor flows in equity funds
Table 16: Excess historical return, retail investor flows in equity funds
Table 17: Excess historical return, institutional investor flows in equity funds
Table 18: Excess historical return, total investor flows in equity funds
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